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In the 1990s many heterodox economists joined labor, human rights and environmental 
advocates in calling for the inclusion of binding labor and environmental standards in 
trade agreements, along with other measures to ensure that deepening economic 
integration would serve the goals of promoting human development. Neoclassical trade 
theorists universally opposed these measures, arguing that countries’ choices over 
standards represented an entirely legitimate source of comparative advantage. In the end, 
the free traders prevailed. But over the past five years several mainstream trade theorists 
have reversed course, and begun to call for fair trade. In this context, fair trade is back on 
the policy agenda. This paper explores the fair trade proposals that emerged in the 1990s, 
and counterpoises the multilateral Social Index Tariff Structure (SITS) as an alternative 
fair trade regime. A SITS regime seeks to protect high standards in those countries where 
they prevail, while providing both the incentives and means for countries that perform 
poorly in this regard to improve their standards over time. The paper explores the 
construction of a hypothetical SITS regime; estimates the effects of the regime on 
bilateral trade flows; and generates estimates of the development funds that SITS would 
make available to promote human development in low-income countries. We find that a 
global system of social tariffs that are very small in magnitude would generate new, 
substantial and stable flows of development funds while incentivizing a race to the top in 
labor and environmental standards. 
 
  2 
Introduction:  
 
By the early 1990s a new political debate had emerged in the US and around the world. It 
concerned the question whether the new trade regimes then being negotiated, most 
importantly NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT that would create the WTO, 
should incorporate labor and environmental standards. On one side many labor, women’s 
and human rights activists, environmentalists and heterodox economists advocated new 
rules to prevent trade in goods that are produced under egregious labor or damaging 
environmental conditions. The “fair traders” claimed that such rules were necessary to 
protect the hard-won gains in high-standard countries while also promoting the 
improvement of social and economic conditions in low-standard countries. On the other 
side of the debate business interests and virtually all mainstream trade economists 
endorsed what they called “free trade” which in this context was re-defined to include the 
idea that trade agreements should have nothing whatsoever to say about labor rights or 
the environment. In place of “fairness,” this camp advocates forcefully for “freedom.”  
 
This was by no means just an academic debate. Suddenly civil society in the global North 
and the South began to pay attention to the details of international trade negotiations. All 
sorts of actors took a stand against what was often referred to as globalization; their 
objections primarily concerned the rules under which countries were integrating their 
economies. Labor and human rights advocates and environmentalists locked arms in 
protest of the WTO, NAFTA, the WB and the IMF and just about every other institution 
that was implicated in globalization. And at the center of the target of much of this angst 
was free trade.  
 
Mainstream economists were bewildered. How could something like free trade—
something that was so obviously beneficial to rich and poor alike, something so well-
established by almost two centuries of economic theory—possibly incite such anger and 
anxiety? Leading trade economists took it upon themselves to discredit the fair traders. 
They divided the critics of free trade into three camps: the ignorant, the cultural 
imperialists, and the deceitful. The ignorant were well-meaning people who were 
innocent of basic economic theory. This group comprised university student groups and 
religious activists who had no direct economic stake in the issue but nevertheless were 
protesting sweatshops out of a sense of moral indignation. The cultural imperialists 
included environmental, human and women’s rights activists who sought to impose their 
own values on those abroad. And perhaps worst of all, the deceitful included labor unions 
in the global North which feigned concern about the rights of workers in the South, but 
who in fact sought merely to protect their members from international competition.  
 
Paul Krugman was particularly forceful in dismissing fair trade. In 1993 Krugman said: 
“it's difficult to have a rational conversation with the opponents of NAFTA; that all 
serious studies, done by those whose minds could have been changed by the evidence, 
have found that NAFTA will produce a small net benefit for the US.” In a 1997 article 
entitled “In Praise of Cheap Labor,” Krugman went much further. He argued that the fair 
trade position was nonsensical, grounded as it was in an unethical “fastidiousness” of 
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Unlike the starving subsistence farmer, the women and children in the sneaker 
factory are working at slave wages for our benefit—and this makes us feel 
unclean. And so there are self-righteous demands for international labor 
standards: We should not, the opponents of globalization insist, be willing to buy 
those sneakers and shirts unless the people who make them receive decent wages 
and work under decent conditions. 
 
But not buying these goods, Krugman continued, would hurt those whom the fair traders 
purported to want to help: 
 
…A policy of good jobs in principle, but no jobs in practice, might assuage our 
consciences, but it is no favor to its alleged beneficiaries… 
 
In short, [fair traders] are not entitled to their self-righteousness. They have not 
thought the matter through. And when the hopes of hundreds of millions are at 
stake, thinking things through is not just good intellectual practice. It is a moral 
duty (Krugman 3/21/1997). 
 
Krugman maintained this stance toward fair traders at least through 2001 when he 
published biting critiques of those who had demonstrated against the WTO in Seattle in 
1999 and elsewhere. Yes, he says, the fact that poor people including children work in 
sweatshops under horrible conditions is regrettable. But the efforts of the protestors to 
end the practice through fair trade initiatives would only make matters worse. 
 
[Fair trade is] not a serious position. Third-world countries desperately need their 
export industries… They can't have those export industries unless they are 
allowed to sell goods produced under conditions that Westerners find appalling, 
by workers who receive very low wages. And that's a fact the anti-globalization 
activists refuse to accept (Krugman 2001). 
 
In the end the trade economists and business interests won this debate. NAFTA was 
passed despite substantial opposition in the US and Canada with only a gesture toward 
labor rights and environmental protection. The Uruguay Round of GATT was completed 
successfully with even less regard for these concerns. Since then there has been a 
growing number of new bilateral trade and investment agreements between the US and 
developing countries that lock in free as opposed to fair trade. So we might expect that 
trade economists today would be self-satisfied that they had saved the world from the 
ignorant, the imperialists and the deceitful.  
 
But today we find more concern than celebration of free trade, even among its 
proponents. There is growing anxiety today among some of the country’s most important 
economists about the flows and outcomes that are associated with international economic 
integration. In the past few years economists of the stature of centrist Paul Samuelson, 
conservative Paul Craig Roberts, and liberals Alan Blinder and Paul Krugman have taken 
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potentially damaging effects of free trade. This shift has been associated with the 
beginnings of a new approach to trade policy in Washington. In 2007 the Democratic 
Congressional leadership reached an agreement with USTR Susan C. Schwab, “A New 
Trade Policy for America.” This pact committed the Bush Administration to include in 
pending free trade agreements (with Peru and Panama) provisions that require the parties 
“to adopt, maintain and enforce in their own laws and in practice the five basic 
internationally-recognized labor standards, as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.” In 
response, Krugman (May 14, 2007) had this to say: 
 
Even trade skeptics tend to shy away from a return to outright protectionism, and 
to look for softer measures, which mainly come down to trying to push up foreign 
wages. The key element of the new trade deal is its inclusion of “labor standards”: 
countries that sign free trade agreements with the United States will have to allow 
union organizing, while abolishing child and slave labor… 
 
So the inclusion of these standards in the deal represents a real victory for 
workers. Realistically, however, labor standards won’t do all that much for 
American workers. No matter how free third-world workers are to organize, 
they’re still going to be paid very little, and trade will continue to place pressure 
on US wages… 
 
By all means, let’s have strong labor standards in our pending trade agreements, 
and let’s approach proposals for new agreements with an appropriate degree of 
skepticism. But if Democrats really want to help American workers, they’ll have 
to do it with a pro-labor policy that relies on better tools than trade policy. 
Universal health care, paid for by taxing the economy’s winners, would be a good 
place to start (emphasis added). 
 
Elsewhere Krugman wrote that “those who are worried about trade have a point, and 
deserve some respect” (Krugman, Dec. 28, 2007). 
 
In making this turn Krugman is placing much greater emphasis than he has in the past on 
the short- and even long-term adjustment costs associated with free trade. In his case, the 
causes of this about face include most importantly the depressive effects on US wages of 
the large and persistent US trade deficit with China; for others, such as Blinder, it is off-
shoring of even high-skilled, white collar jobs. In this context, it appears that fair trade 
may now have a chance for a new hearing among trade economists. But this presents 
heterodox economists with a substantial challenge that they did not face so acutely in the 
1990s, when fair trade remained elusive. What should fair trade look like? What kinds of 
fair trade regimes would be effective in achieving its primary purposes, and be ethically 
defensible in a world of such inequality in wealth, income and life chances?  
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Revisiting Fair Trade 
 
The fair traders of the early 1990s advocated several distinct approaches to achieve fair 
trade. The first (and the simplest) is the approach now codified in the “New Trade Policy 
for America” initiative that we just considered. It entails provisions in trade agreements 
that permit a signatory to ban any imports that are deemed to be illicit in the sense of 
having been produced under inadequate labor or environmental standards abroad. 
Precedents exist for this kind of action. For instance, US law has prohibited the 
importation of goods produced by prison labor at least since the passage of the Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1930.  
 
A second approach, the social charter, builds on the first and is more ambitious in the 
extent and depth of the harmonization of standards that it requires. In principle a social 
charter mandates that nations recognize and protect some minimum set of social rights 
and entitlements as a condition for participating in a common market. Established 
through multilateral negotiations among the affected nations, these rights might be taken 
to reflect what are deemed by member states to be vital rights and interests that cannot be 
compromised in pursuit of comparative advantage. In the view of its proponents, a 
sufficiently strong charter would prevent destructive competition among member states. 
Some advocates argued for the adoption of a social charter as a central component of 
NAFTA (e.g., Castañeda and Heredia 1992).  
 
A third approach entails the imposition of “social tariffs” on goods produced in countries 
with relatively weak labor rights and environmental protections. The goal of this 
approach is to protect the gains in labor and environmental protections achieved in high-
standard countries and to encourage the adoption of higher standards in low-standard 
countries. It seeks these results by canceling the competitive advantage enjoyed by firms 
operating where standards are weak (see Dorman 1988 and 1992; Lebowitz 1988; 
Chapman 1991; Ramstad 1987; and Rothstein 1993). For Dorman (1992), social tariffs 
would be leveled unilaterally by high-standard countries due to the unlikelihood that low-
standard countries would agree to multilateral accords that include a social tariff. The 
tariff would be calibrated commodity by commodity to cancel the precise competitive 
advantage gained on the basis of inferior standards.
1 Under this approach, a nation’s own 
standards would be taken as the relevant benchmark for instituting tariffs. Workers and/or 
firms that believe they have been harmed by unfair competition from foreign firms that 
exploit lower standards would seek redress in the form of a tariff through a petition to an 
authority that is authorized to hear evidence and issue a binding ruling.
2 
                     
1 Advocates of this approach tend to view government provision of low standards as 
subsidies to domestic producers. This allows these producers to undercut world prices, 
which is tantamount to dumping; hence the term “social dumping.”  
2 Chapman’s proposals regarding environmental standards and trade are similar. Lebowitz 
(1988) develops a simple game theoretic analysis to argue the case for a social tariff, 
although in his view the tariff is a second-best strategy made necessary by the current 
inability of workers to organize internationally (for him the first best solution). See also 
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Under a fourth fair trade approach high-standard countries would require domestic 
corporations that invest in low-standard countries to respect the worker rights and 
environmental protections that exist in the home country. This policy was proposed by a 
most unlikely source, Jagdish Bhagwati (1993; 1995), in the context of the debate over 
North American integration. The proposal is patterned after the “Sullivan Principles,” 
which required US corporations that invested in South Africa during the apartheid era to 
comply with US laws against discrimination. Though a resolute free trader, Bhagwati 
proposed this approach as a second-best alternative to the free trade that he preferred, in 
hopes of defusing the anti-NAFTA sentiments that almost succeeded in derailing the 
agreement.  
 
The Sullivan Principles approach is designed to prevent corporations in high-standard 
countries from relocating to developing countries simply to secure cost savings owing to 
the lower standards that generally exist in the South. Bhagwati argues that this approach 
removes the incentive for firms to seek the lowest standards, but does so in a manner that 
respects the governance rights of the host country. Bhagwati opposes any requirement 
that developing countries adopt the same standards as developed countries on the grounds 
that it would infringe upon their sovereignty and reduce their level of economic welfare. 
For example, the demand that Mexico harmonize its environmental standards and 
practices with those of the US, expressed by some opponents of NAFTA, is unacceptable 
to Bhagwati: 
 
[Surely] the manner in which Mexico divides its overall effort to meet 
environmental objectives among different industries and regions must reflect its 
own priorities just as ours reflect our own interests. Demands on Mexico to do 
exactly what we would do are therefore not sensible. Since we would properly not 
submit to them if made by others, they are also unreasonable (Bhagwati 1993, 
13). 
 
Evaluating Fair Trade 
 
Evaluating each of these proposals requires inter alia a careful consideration of the 
normative criteria that we bring to bear. What purposes should fair trade achieve? Who is 
to be its primary beneficiary? Who should bear the costs that it imposes? Krugman and 
the other free traders were certainly correct in the 1990s in drawing attention to the 
consequences of well-intentioned fair trade—in demanding that we look beyond a 
reflexive outrage at sweatshops and ecological destruction to inquire whether the fair 
trade alternatives on offer would in fact improve the life circumstances of the 
dispossessed. And when we undertake such an investigation, we find that in fact the 
standard fair-trade prescriptions were problematic when judged against the normative 
claims that the fair traders espouse. 
 
What are these normative claims? At its best fair trade is motivated by an ethical 
                                                             
Ramstad (1987) for a discussion of Commons’ defense of social tariffs. 
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that the benefits of economic integration flow broadly and benefit most those in most dire 
need. Drawing on the capability framework of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and 
others, DeMartino (2000) frames this commitment in terms of an internationalist ethic 
that seeks equality among the world’s inhabitants in their ability to live valued lives, or 
what Sen (1992) calls their capabilities to achieve valued functionings. Functionings are 
beings and doings that people value; capabilities refer to the full set of functionings that 
are available to a person. This framework yields the following normative standard for 
evaluating global policy regimes: “A global policy regime is just to the degree that it 
promotes the harmonization of capabilities to achieve functionings at a level that is 
sufficient, universally attainable and sustainable.” Harmonization of capabilities signals 
the commitment of this principle to substantive equality that refers not just to the formal 
rights people enjoy but also what they can actually achieve, given the determinants of 
income, wealth, physical and mental well-being, the institutional structure of their 
societies, their race, gender and other factors that shape the opportunity set that is 
available to them. Sufficiency implies the need to attend to the level at which this 
equality is achieved. The goal is not maximization of consumption but instead the 
achievement of a level of capabilities that provide for a good human life (Nussbaum 
1992). Finally, sustainability requires attention to the ways in which the enjoyments of 
our freedoms bear on future generations. It may place limits on the functionings that 
people can pursue and especially on the means by which they pursue them so that their 
actions do not diminish the capabilities set of those who will follow. 
 
How do the circa 1990s fair trade proposals fare against this (admittedly demanding) 
normative standard? Unfortunately, each fails in one way or another. First, those 
strategies (such as the Sullivan Principles and social tariff approaches) that are intended 
to be imposed unilaterally run the risk of serving purposes quite opposed to those for 
which they are intended. They open the door to exploitation by nationalist or other 
powerful interests, and this opportunity is of course far greater for wealthy societies than 
it is for poorer countries. The politically biased application of trade sanctions on 
supposedly humanitarian grounds by the Reagan Administration during the 1980s 
provide a case in point: the Reagan Administration punished with trade sanctions 
countries with regimes that were viewed as hostile to the US, such as Nicaragua during 
the Sandinista regime, while ignoring egregious worker rights violations in countries 
taken to be allies, such as Guatemala. It is no surprise, then, that many labor rights 
advocates across the South opposed the new fair trade initiatives of the 1990s that linked 
US trade access to labor standards (see Cavanagh 1993; Cavanagh et al 1988). Though 
there are no guarantees against misuse of any policy instrument, these risks might be 
reduced through participatory, cooperative multilateral approaches that establish new 
global policy regimes. The goal of global capabilities equality, then, weighs heavily in 
favor of multilateral approaches that afford poorer countries meaningful opportunity to 
shape the rules under which they will live, and that provide a policing mechanism to 
prevent distortion by rich countries for their own ends.  
 
Second, the labor standards and social charter approaches include no dynamic that will 
lead to improving standards over time. Given the extraordinary inequality today in 
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include both rich and poor countries would yield a very low floor—one so low as to fail 
to prevent the corrosive effects of competition on strong protections in high-standard 
countries. Moreover, there is no mechanism to assist low-standard countries in enforcing, 
let alone raising their own standards. Hence, there is little prospect in this approach for 
achieving the goal of equalizing critical capabilities between rich and poor countries.
3 
 
We conclude tentatively that while the institution of a fair trade regime is desirable and 
perhaps today even likely, the proposals of the 1990s that received the most attention are 
normatively inadequate. They do not go far enough in promoting genuine international 
equality. Indeed, they threaten to punish poor countries for their poverty, while failing to 
provide them with the means necessary to ensure expanding freedoms for their 
inhabitants.  
 
But what kind of fair trade regime might do better? What kinds of mechanisms might it 
include to promote harmonization of capabilities to achieve functionings in a world in 
which the gap between the capabilities rich and capabilities poor is so stark? What kind 
of regime might incorporate incentives that induce countries to take steps to promote 
capabilities equality, while continuing to take advantage of the benefits derived from an 
essentially liberal trade regime?  
 
A Fair Trade Thought Experiment:  
The Social Index Tariff Structure (SITS) 
 
The previous discussion suggests a detailed set of criteria for judging fair trade regimes. 
A global trading regime that is consistent with the principle of capabilities equality 
should achieve several interrelated objectives. First, it should incorporate incentives for 
countries to take steps to promote capabilities equality domestically. Second, given the 
extreme gap between the North and the South, it should also provide the means necessary 
for impoverished countries to expand the capabilities of their inhabitants in the aggregate. 
Third, and contra neoliberal trade agreements that are silent on the matter of the policy 
sources of comparative advantage, this regime should penalize countries for pursuing 
strategies to enhance export performance that are capabilities-reducing for those at home 
with relatively meager capabilities sets. Fourth, the regime should also preclude domestic 
policies that induce international capabilities inequality, such as those that benefit a 
wealthy country at the expense of a poorer trading partner. Finally, the regime should 
                     
3 DeMartino (2000) explores these and other normative and practical shortcomings of 
these fair trade approaches. In response to those who worry that the premature raising of 
labor standards in the global South will undermine economic development, Dorman 
(2006) presents the case that low standards entail particularly high (but often hidden) 
costs in this context that offset (and may entirely negate) their purported growth benefits. 
For instance, a family facing the burden of caring for an injured worker may deem it 
necessary to withdraw one or more children from school, owing to the relative lack of 
sufficient social services in poorer countries. He concludes that raising labor standards in 
the South may be economically efficient, both in the short- and long-run. 
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political reforms that deepen capabilities equality. 
  
We explore here one possible means for achieving these goals—what Cullenberg and 
DeMartino (1995) and DeMartino (2000) have called the “social-index tariff structure,” 
or SITS. It is intended as a thought experiment that results from asking the question, what 
kind of trade regime might achieve ethical trade ethically? It therefore foregrounds a 
strong commitment to international egalitarianism, and seeks ways to put international 
economic integration in service of this objective.  
 
Put most simply, the SITS is a multilateral trade regime that would promote benevolent 
means by which countries seek good trade performance, while at the same time punishing 
countries that pursue export-promoting strategies that undermine capabilities equality. It 
does this through the implementation of a system of social tariffs. Unlike unilateral social 
tariffs, this approach would arise out of multilateral negotiations that would determine the 
criterion for establishing social tariffs, and establish a new institution for imposing and 
policing them (see below).  
 
Under a SITS regime, each country would be assigned an index number which reflects its 
performance in promoting the average capabilities of its citizens relative to its means, 
and the degree to which these capabilities are distributed equally. This index number 
provides a basis for assessing and ranking countries’ respective capabilities performance. 
Countries with relatively similar levels of performance would then be grouped together 
for trade purposes. These groupings would determine the application of social tariffs: 
tariffs would be applied when any country exports to another with a significantly higher 
index number. 
 
Constructing a SITS regime entails several steps, all of which entail judgment rather than 
the mechanical application of rules. We view this feature of the SITS as a virtue, since it 
brings to the surface and opens up to close scrutiny the normative values that necessarily 
underlie any international trade regime. 
 
Human Development and Equality 
 
First, we need some measure of each country’s level of capabilities. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) generated by the UNDP and reported yearly in the Human 
Development Report (HDR) represents an explicit first approximation of a measure of 
capabilities. The HDI is a composite measure based on three indicators: welfare, life 
expectancy and educational attainment. On the basis of this index, countries are ranked 
according to levels of “human development.”  
 
Each of these three indicators is taken to be important in its own right, and to serve as a 
proxy for other indicators of capabilities that are harder to measure. The indicator of 
welfare is derived from per capita national income; it reveals a good bit about peoples’ 
access to vital commodities and other amenities, and correlates with many important 
freedoms (such as the freedom of mobility). In calculating the welfare indicator, the 
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transformation reflects the view that income has a diminishing marginal effect on agency 
and wellbeing. Life expectancy provides insight into the ability of people to avoid 
preventable mortality, of course, but also reflects their ability to get access to health care, 
and to be properly nourished and sheltered. It might also provide some indirect 
information about relative equality since a country marked by particularly severe 
inequality in the distribution of income and other opportunities might exhibit a life 
expectancy index number that is very low relative to its per capita income. For example, 
though Brazil enjoyed a per capita income substantially above Cuba in 2007, its life 
expectancy index value of .813 fell below Cuba’s .863 (UNDP 2009). In part, this 
difference in life expectancy reflected the much greater degree of income inequality in 
Brazil. The educational attainment indicator is generated by combining a country’s adult 
literacy rate with its enrollment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education. This 
indicator reveals something about the ability of people to make sense of and respond to 
the events and forces shaping their lives, to use new (information and other) technologies, 
etc. These also may be vital to (but are by no means sufficient for) their political efficacy.  
 
There are limits to the information provided by any one component of the HDI—and 
even to all three components taken together. Certainly, there are important functionings 
that the HDI misses—such as the ability to achieve self-respect, or to voice one’s opinion 
on pressing political matters free of fear of reprisals. But while we should exercise some 
caution in interpreting HDI data, we can fairly treat the index as a source of useful 
information on at least certain basic functionings.
4  
 
As an aggregate measure, the HDI provides no direct information about the degree of 
capabilities inequality in a country (though it does provide some indirect information, as 
discussed above). If the goal is to devise an index that is sensitive to both the level and 
degree of equality of capabilities, then we need to incorporate other information.  
 
Systematic inequality in a country takes many forms, tied as it often is to differences in 
class, gender, ethnicity, race and so forth. Under the principle of capabilities equality, all 
of these all illegitimate. Our measure of a country’s performance must also account for 
                     
4 Various researchers have expressed concern about the HDI as a measure of capabilities 
in particular, and other means to measure capabilities more generally (see Comim, 
Qizilbash and Alkire 2008). There is a consensus that theorizing and measuring 
capabilities pose difficult challenges. In our view, whether the HDI is an appropriate 
measure of capabilities depends entirely on the purposes to which it is to be put. In the 
present context what might otherwise represent deficiencies (its focus on basic rather than 
complex functionings, its thin empirical basis, its conflation of functionings achievement 
with capabilities and so forth) are likely to be beneficial. The goal here, after all, is to 
envision a multilateral trading regime that will promote capabilities equality; as such, it 
must be agreeable to negotiators from nations across the globe with diverse levels of 
wealth, diverse cultures, etc. In this context, an approach to capabilities that focuses on a 
small set of basic functionings might be expected to induce less resistance than a more 
precise, nuanced and complex measure, as Sen has argued (1992).  
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all of these may be expected to contribute to income inequality, we might take the latter 
as an imperfect but relevant proxy for these diverse forms of inequality. We therefore 
incorporate the Gini coefficient into SITS computations since it is widely regarded as 
useful and, equally important for present purposes, it is available for most countries.
5 
 
Worker and Women’s Economic Rights 
 
As discussed above, fair trade is motivated in part by concerns for labor rights and the 
physical environment. Fair traders seek to ensure that the competitive pressures that arise 
through international trade do not undermine labor rights or ecological protection—either 
through explicit government actions (such as increased labor repression or relaxation of 
environmental laws) or through worker and citizen accommodation in the face of capital 
flight. Ideally, we want a trade regime whose competitive pressures induce an 
enhancement rather than a subversion of worker rights and environmental protections. 
Hence the need to incorporate into the SITS measure of performance measures of worker 
rights and ecological practices. 
 
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset “contains standards-based 
quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human 
rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2009…for countries of all regime-types and 
from all regions of the world” (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/). The project has been 
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, the World Bank, GTZ (of the German 
government) and other institutions. CIRI presents useful measures of worker rights and 
the economic rights of women. It is particularly appropriate for present purposes because 
it focuses on state behavior: “The data set contains measures of government human rights 
practices, not human rights policies or overall human rights conditions (which may be 
affected by non-state actors)” (“CIRI Human Rights Data Project: FAQ,” at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/faq.asp). This is important, since a SITS regime targets inter 
alia changes in state behavior in pursuit of human development.  
 
CIRI has established 16 individual measures of rights—ranging for example from 
freedom from extrajudicial killings, disappearances and torture to freedom of speech, 
movement and assembly. It also derives two composite measures of rights from these 
individual components. One of these, the Empowerment Rights Index (EMPINX), 
combines a country’s scores on five of these individual indices: Freedom of Movement, 
Freedom of Speech, Worker’s Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion 
indicators. This indicator is scored from 0 (which implies no government respect for 
these five rights) to 14 (for full government respect for these five rights). We incorporate 
this index in the SITS calculations because it relates so closely to the concerns of labor 
and human rights advocates who see in free trade an inducement for governments to deny 
                     
5 There are of course many alternative ways to define and measure income inequality and 
some of these might be equally useful for the purposes of the present calculation. The 
measure used here is among the simplest and most convenient, given data availability, 
but it is by no means uniquely appropriate. 
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Unfortunately, this measure largely ignores gender rights (though a country that denies 
worker rights to women would score lower in the worker rights component on that 
account). Given the frequency with which women workers face labor market 
discrimination and the frequency with which this serves as a strategy to depress wages to 
achieve comparative advantage and to attract foreign investment, it is imperative to 
incorporate a measure of women’s economic rights. CIRI provides a separate measure of 
this variable (WECON). This is scored on a scale from 0 to 3; adding this to EMPINX 
yields a composite, gender-sensitive empowerment rights indicator (GER) that ranges 




Next, we need a measure of countries’ environmental performance. Over the past several 
decades a number of leading indicators of environmental performance have been 
identified by the scientific and international community. These indicators cover a wide 
range of environmental measures from carbon emissions to water quality measures, to 
indicators of the level of stress on fisheries, forest and agricultural lands. Taken 
individually, of course, no indicator is able to provide a comprehensive measure of 
environmental performance. 
 
A handful of comprehensive environmental indices exist that seek to do just this. Of 
these, we have chosen the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) as a comprehensive 
and yet tractable measure of a nation's environmental policy performance and pursuit of 
environmental sustainability. The EPI emerged in 2006; it is intended to provide a 
measure of environmental sustainability and current national environmental policy 
performance.   
 
 The EPI is calculated based on a set of 25 indicators that represent measurable impacts 
on the environment. Indicators are chosen based on their relevance, transparency, and 
data quality. A long-term public health or ecosystem sustainability goal is identified for 
each indicator based on internationally accepted standards set by international 
organizations and leading national regulatory requirements or prevailing scientific 
                     
6 Under standard mainstream trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson) 
women in developing countries ought to benefit most from trade liberalization since they 
provide the abundant factor (unskilled labor) in these countries. More generally, trade 
theory predicts that free trade will reduce overall income inequality in developing 
countries since the chief beneficiaries should be unskilled labor. Unfortunately, neither of 
these predictions is borne out by recent empirical studies. Indeed, overall inequality 
generally rises in developing and developed countries as a consequence of free trade. On 
trade and inequality see Koujianou Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007); on the complex effects 
of trade liberalization on women, see for example Seguino (2000);  Braunstein (2006); 
the essays in Grown, Braunstein, and Malhotra (2006); and Bussman 2008. 
 
  13consensus (Esty et al. 2008). 
  
Despite its virtues, the EPI is not without its drawbacks, of course. The EPI draws upon 
the best available global datasets on environmental performance, yet data quality and 
availability are uneven. The weighting of the 25 indicators also invites controversy. 
However, the approach of the EPI is to look to international consensus and improved data 
collection techniques to migrate toward an ever-better environmental indicator (Esty et al. 
2008). 
  
 Each of the 25 indicators is converted to a proximity-to-target measure with a range of 
zero to 100 (where 0 corresponds to the worst performance observed and 100 
corresponds to the achievement of the indicator target). The distribution of each indicator 
is studied closely to identify extreme outliers, which are adjusted using various statistical 
techniques. In the unusual instances where countries exceed the target, index values are 
reset accordingly (Esty, et al. 2008).
7 
  
Measuring Country Performance 
 
We are now in position to develop a performance indicator (PERF) that combines 
country’s performance in these areas: education, health, income equality, worker and 
women’s economic rights, and environmental practices. We standardize each indicator, 
so that the range for each value is [0,1]. A value of 0 indicates the lowest practical or 
possible achievement, while a value of 1 indicates the highest practical or possible 
achievement.
8 We take the simple average of all these terms, which signifies their equal 
weighting in the PERF calculation.    
 
                     
7 The data used for calculating each of the indicators described in the text come from 
various years. The UNDP data used in constructing the HDI and the Gini data are from 
2007 or most recent year available (MRYA); the CIRI data used in constructing the rights 
indices are from 2008 or MRYA; and the EPI data are taken from the MRYA.  
8 The UNDP computes for each component of the HDI the performance of each country 
against minimum and maximum values, or what it calls “goalposts.” The EPI is also 
constructed in this way (as per the text). We have used this method throughout. For 
instance, our Gender-Sensitive Empowerment Rights Index (GER), which appears below, 
is calculated as follows: for any country i, GERi = 1 – [(17 – (EMPINX + WECON)i) / 
(17– 0)] since the range for (EMPINX + WECON) is [0, 17]. If a country achieves a 
(EMPINX + WECON) score of 17, it earns the GER value of 1 in the PERF calculation. 
We have also standardized the Gini data in this way. We note one complication in our 
doing so: while the values of the educational attainment, health and environmental 
indices are clustered from .2 to .9 (approximately), our standardized measures for income 
equality and rights protections range from 0 to 1. This implies that the latter variables 
have a larger impact on our performance measures than do the former. This could be 
corrected for by standardizing them on a [.2, .9] scale, of course.  
  14Each of the terms in PERF is correlated highly with per capita income, as we would 
expect. There is no guarantee that a country will improve its performance in each term as 
it grows richer, to be sure. But it is certainly the case that wealth enhances a country’s 
ability to improve its performance. As a consequence of this correlation we must take 
account of countries’ means to promote capabilities; otherwise, we would simply reward 
wealth and punish poverty. To do this, we first remove the welfare component of the HDI 
(since it is based entirely on per capita income). Even with this term removed, wealthier 
countries are far more likely to perform well relative to poorer countries because they can 
better afford investments in health care and educational services. What we want to know 
is how well a country is performing in promoting capabilities levels and equality relative 
to its means. Hence, we need to adjust performance by accounting for differences in per 
capita income. 
For these reasons, we regress country performance against log GDP/capita. We then take 
the ratio of each country’s actual PERF value to its Expected PERF (E(PERF)) as given 
by the regression. This yields a simple way to assess each country’s performance relative 
to its means: good performers at all income levels achieve a ratio greater than one while 
poor performers at all income levels score below one. Let us call this the Means-Adjusted 
PERF, or APERF. The derivation is as follows: 
PERFi = (EDi + Hi + EQi + GERi + ENVi)  /  5      (1) 
where 
ED = Educational attainment index, country i 
Hi  = Health attainment index, country i 
EQi  = Income equality index, country i 
GERi  = Gender-Sensitive Empowerment Rights index, country i  
and  
ENVi  = Environmental Performance index, country i.  
Then, 
APERFi  =  PERFi  / E(PERFi)          ( 2 )  
The SITS Trade Regime: A Simulation 
  
With the APERF index we can develop a multilateral tariff structure that rewards and 
penalizes countries based on their capabilities performance relative to their means. The 
social tariff between any two countries is determined by their relative index values: if 
France achieves a significantly higher APERF value than the US, the US would face a 
  15social tariff in its exports to France. If, at the same time, French performance 
significantly lags that of Kenya, it would face social tariffs on its exports to Kenya.  
 
Table 1 presents SITS country rankings based on APERF values for the 123 countries for 
which the necessary data are available.
9 The APERF values approximate a normal 
distribution; we have standardized these values (transforming them into standard 
deviations about the mean). 
 
SITS tariff bands are unique for each country. Under this regime, a country would export 
freely to all other countries that have APERF values sufficiently close to or below its 
own. We have defined “sufficiently close” as within one standard deviation of the 
distribution of all APERF values above and below a country’s own APERF value. On the 
other hand, the country would face social tariffs when it exports to countries that are 
significantly better performers; moreover, the size of the tariff would depend on the size 
of the gap in the two countries’ relative performance. If the trading partner’s APERF 
were between one and two standard deviations above its own, the country would face the 
“base” SITS tariff on its exports to the higher performer; if the gap were between two and 
three standard deviations, the country would face twice the base tariff on these exports. 
Conversely, a country would win tariff protection when it imports goods from a country 
with an APERF value that is more than one standard deviation below its own, with the 
size of the tariff again depending on the size of the gap between the two countries’ 
respective APERF values.
10   
 
In Table 1 we demonstrate the operation of the SITS by focusing on the situation facing 
one country, China. China has an APERF substantially below 1 (.8804) and so is a 
relatively poor performer. The standard deviation of the APERF values for all 123 
countries is 0.1093. Under a SITS regime China would face no tariffs on its exports to 
countries with lower APERF values than its own or even to better performing countries 
whose APERF values are within one standard deviation of China’s (with APERFs at or 
below .9897). In contrast, China’s exports face the base tariff when it exports to countries 
with APERF values between one and two standard deviations above its own APERF; two 
times the base tariff when it exports to countries between two and three standard 
deviations above its own; three times the base tariffs for countries between three and four 
standard deviations above it; and four times the base tariff for countries between four and 
five. 
                     
9 Educational attainment, health and Gini data are taken from the UNDP. The rights data 
are taken from CIRI, while the environmental performance data are taken from the EPI. 
Citations appear in the text. 
10For the purposes of establishing the SITS regime the computation of APERF values 
might be based on a moving average of data over some multiyear period to smooth out 
the adjustments in trade flows and tariffs that might otherwise result from short-term 
fluctuations in APERF calculations.  
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APERF Values, Country Rankings, 
and Tariff Bands for China 
Rank Country  APERF Rank Country  APERF  Rank Country  APERF 
Four standard deviations from China  40 Poland  1.048  82 Columbia  0.968 
1 Burundi  1.335 41  Paraguay  1.044  83 Morocco  0.967 
Three standard deviations from China  42 Spain  1.043  84 Dominican  Republic  0.960 
2 Guinea-Bissau  1.309 43  Burkina  Faso  1.043  85 Kenya  0.960 
Two standard deviations from China  44 Cambodia  1.041  86 Gambia  0.960 
3 Malawi  1.205 45  Ethiopia 1.041  87  Rwanda  0.959 
4 Kyrgyzstan  1.199 46  Netherlands  1.041  88 Mali  0.958 
5 Albania  1.186 47  Romania 1.039  89  Algeria  0.946 
6 Madagascar  1.179 48  Australia 1.038  90  Congo  0.944 
7 Guyana  1.177 49  Germany  1.033  91 Mexico  0.940 
8 Tajikistan  1.175 50  Italy  1.032  92 Greece  0.940 
9 Philippines  1.158 51  Peru 1.032  93  Venezuela  0.938 
10  Dem. Rep. Congo  1.153  52  Armenia  1.031  94  Guinea  0.937 
11 Mongolia  1.144  53 Switzerland  1.030  95 Niger  0.933 
12 Bangladesh  1.137  54 Indonesia  1.026  96 Bolivia  0.932 
13 Moldova  1.129  55 Thailand 1.026  97  Senegal  0.930 
14 Sweden  1.125  56 Slovenia  1.025  98 Zambia  0.926 
15 Nepal  1.115  57 Nicaragua  1.024  99 Azerbaijan  0.924 
16 Finland  1.109  58 United  Kingdom 1.023  100  Kazakhstan  0.912 
17 Laos  1.106  59 Chile  1.021  101 Sierra  Leone  0.907 
18  Ghana  1.104  60  India  1.017  102  Trinidad and Tobago  0.900 
One standard deviation from China  61 Djibouti  1.005  103 Central  African  Republic  0.897 
19 Czech  Republic  1.096  62 Belgium  1.004  104 Tunisia  0.895 
20 Costa  Rica  1.092  63 Panama 1.002  105  Pakistan  0.893 
21 New  Zealand  1.091  64 Lithuania 1.002  106  Yemen  0.885 
22 Japan  1.090  65 Macedonia  1.000  107 Côte  d'Ivoire  0.882 
23 Croatia  1.087  66 Ireland  0.996  108  China  0.880 
24 Bulgaria  1.075  67 Suriname 0.994  109  Malaysia  0.880 
25 Ukraine  1.071  68 Latvia  0.991  110 Bhutan  0.875 
26 Tanzania  1.070  69 Luxembourg 0.991  111  Nigeria  0.869 
27 Denmark  1.067  70 South  Africa  0.990  112 Mauritania  0.867 
28 Norway  1.067  Within one standard deviation of China  113 Israel  0.851 
29 Portugal  1.064  71 Benin  0.988  114 Russia  0.850 
30 Hungary  1.062  72 Brazil  0.987  115 Turkey  0.842 
31 Canada  1.061  73 Uzbekistan 0.984  116  Iran  0.825 
32 Uruguay  1.057  74 Uganda  0.982  117 Mozambique  0.807 
33 Slovakia  1.056  75 Argentina 0.980  118  Namibia  0.800 
34  Viet Nam  1.054  76  Sri Lanka  0.979  119  Gabon  0.792 
35 El  Salvador  1.053  77 Jordan  0.978  One standard deviation below China 
36 Jamaica  1.053  78 USA  0.976 120  Cameroon  0.765 
37 Estonia  1.052  79 Honduras  0.971  121 Chad  0.755 
38 France  1.051  80 Guatemala  0.970  122 Swaziland  0.709 
39 Austria  1.048  81 Belarus 0.970  123  Botswana  0.689 
  17SITS entails a system of carrots and sticks. The sticks take the form of tariff penalties: 
poor performers would face obstacles in exporting to better performers. But the carrots 
are equally meaningful—both practically and ethically. A SITS regime would generate 
substantial new revenues that could be used to promote human capabilities in poor 
countries that are taking steps to make improvements (as reflected in the terms of 
APERF). This point is fundamental: one of the ethical weaknesses of many of the fair 
trade proposals that emerged in the 1990s is that they made demands on low-income 
countries while providing them with no support; the adjustment costs to fair trade was to 
be born entirely by the poorer countries. This contributed to the antipathy of many free 
traders (like Bhagwati) and labor advocates in the global South who saw in these 
proposals a cover for protectionism pure and simple. To be both politically viable and 
ethically defensible, a fair trade regime must redistribute resources from high-income 
countries to those low-income countries that are taking steps to promote human 
development. In the case of SITS, this would require the establishment of new 
multilateral institutions to receive and disburse SITS-generated revenues.  
 
There are fifty-nine countries for which we have both the data required to calculate 
APERF values and bilateral trade data as provided by the GTAP 6 Database (Dimaranan 
and McDougall 2006: these are 2001 data).
11 We can simulate a global SITS regime with 
these fifty-nine countries.  
 
How much revenue might a SITS regime yield? Generating this estimate is difficult. 
One problem that undermines precision is the matter of the elasticity of demand for 
exports. Many estimates of this elasticity exist (see, e.g., Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 2008; 
Liu, Arndt and Hertel 2001; Marquez 2002; Senhadji and Montenegro 1999). The range 
among these estimates is quite large for any one country. Moreover, elasticities of 
demand for exports vary markedly across countries (owing to the differences in the 
content of their exports, the nature of their trading relationships and so forth). Making 
matters worse, estimates of this elasticity are not available for many countries.  
 
For these reasons it is prudent to run multiple simulations and derive from them a range 
of revenue estimates. We present here three sets of estimates: one that uses the mean 
elasticity reported in Senhadji and Montenegro (1999) for all countries; a second that 
uses a measure that is one standard deviation below the mean value (which implies a 
larger absolute value for the elasticity and hence, a larger impact on trade; and a third that 
uses a measure one standard deviation above the mean (which decreases the impact of the 
elasticity). For any given SITS base tariff this approach provides us with a range of 
estimates of SITS revenues. A more finely calibrated simulation than we are able to 
provide here would have to take better account of this matter, to be sure—such as by 
                     
11 GTAP is a collaborative project based at the Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue 
University. It should be noted here that the simulation presented here is at best an 
approximation, owing to the fact that by relying on the most recent data in constructing 
our indices we are able to include more countries than would otherwise be possible, the 
bilateral trade data available to us at present is taken from 2001. Hence, our comparisons 
with other flows (see below) will also be taken from 2001.  
  18including a unique elasticity measure for each country.  
 
For illustrative purposes, Table 2 provides an overview of trade flows among 15 
countries that are subject to SITS tariffs (2001 data; see fn.11) and the operation of the 
SITS regime. It shows the application of SITS tariffs; the size of the tariffs (when the 
base tariff applies, and when a multiple of the base tariff applies). Finally, using the mean 
elasticity of demand for exports and a one-percent base tariff, it also shows the SITS 
revenues that would be generated on these trade flows as a consequence of the tariffs.  
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 Table 2: 
SITS Tariff Bands and Revenues (millions, US$), 15 Selected Countries 
 (Mean Elasticity of Demand; 1% Base Tariff) 
 
  Botswana Russia China Mexico USA Brazil Germany India Indonesia  UK Australia France Japan  Philippines Malawi 
Botswana      0.1   0.0   0.1   1.5   0.1   1.0   0.1   0.0   70.7   0.1   0.4   0.5   0.0   0.1 
Russia                 -       -    -    75.6   6.6   85.0   7.6   1.6   22.6   1.2   20.6   81.3   3.7   0.0 
China                 -     -      -    -    -    207.3   25.1   30.7   109.0   59.6   98.7   601.7   31.8   0.4 
Mexico                 -     -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -    10.2   22.0   0.8   0.0 
United States of America                 -     -    -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -    737.7   82.8   1.0 
Brazil                 -     -    -    -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    -    1.0   0.0 
Germany                 -     -    -    -    -    -      -    -    -    -    -    -    11.9   0.3 
India                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -      -    -    -    -    -    3.6   0.4 
Indonesia                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -    -    -    -    8.5   0.0 
United Kingdom                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -    -    -    7.4   0.2 
Australia                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -    -    7.4   0.0 
France                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -    -    0.1 
Japan                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -     0.3 
Philippines                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -      -   
Malawi                 -     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    






1 Table 3 and Figure 1 provide aggregate SITS revenue estimates for the fifty-nine 
countries in our sample, assuming a base SITS tariff of one, three and five percent, and 
assuming the three measures of elasticity just described.  
 
Table 3: 
SITS Revenue Estimate, 2001, 59 Countries 
(Millions US$) 
 
   Mean Elasticity +1 SD  Mean Elasticity  Mean Elasticity -1 SD 
1% Base Tariff  $4,949 $5,005 $5,062
3% Base Tariff  $14,149 $14,657 $15,165
5% Base Tariff  $22,418 $23,830 $25,242
 
These data are plotted in Figure 1, which provides a SITS revenue interval for each base 
tariff that reflects our three elasticity estimates.  
 
Figure 1: 




For the fifty-nine countries in our sample, bilateral trade flows in 2001 with a one percent 
base tariff yields between $4.949 and $5.062 billion in tariff revenue. A five percent base 
tariff yields between $22.418 and $25.242 billion. These estimates are conservative, not 
least since they exclude all countries for which we do not have data. 
 
How significant are these totals? We can gauge their significance by comparing them 
with other flows that contribute to economic development, such as official development 
assistance (ODA), remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI). The most relevant comparison for SITS revenues are with ODA and remittances since for many of the 
poorest countries (where capabilities are most impoverished) these are the most important 
international flows. These countries do not compete well for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (or portfolio investment). FDI flows to the developing world are particularly 
concentrated, with China and a handful of middle-income countries garnering the lion’s 
share.  
 
Table 4 presents the data on 2001 flows. The SITS revenues generated by trade among 
the fifty-nine countries in this simulation yield between 14% and 71.5% of total ODA to 
all developing countries in 2001 (depending on the size of the base tariff and elasticity 
estimate). Alternatively, these SITS revenues represent between 5.2% and 26.6% of total 
remittance flows to all developing countries; and, most importantly, between 109% and 
556% of all remittances to the “low-income” developing countries. Finally, SITS 
revenues represent between 2.3% and 11.75% of all FDI flows to developing countries; 
and between 8.29% and 42.29% of FDI flows to “low-income” developing countries. 
These comparisons are notable: they indicate that even very small SITS tariffs suffice to 
generate substantial new development funds. 
 
Table 4: 
Trade and Assistance Flows to Developing and Low Income Countries, 2001 
(Current Prices, Millions US$) 
 
In-Flow 2001 
Official Development Assistance /1 
All Developing Countries 





All Developing Countries 
Low-Income Developing Countries 
 94,896 
     4,539 
Foreign Direct Investment /3 
All Developing Countries 
Low-Income Developing Countries 
   214,696 
   59,677 
NA = Not Available 
Sources 
/1  OECD DAC2a ODA Disbursements Dataset (2010). 
/2  World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010).  World Bank staff 
estimates based on IMF balance of payments data. 
/3  UNCTAD, UNCTADstat database (2010). 
 
A SITS regime could also be introduced within any regional trade regime, such as 
NAFTA. Indeed, in the first instance it might be much easier for a small number of 
countries to come to agreement on the details that SITS comprises.  Even in a limited 
regional context, SITS might at least partially achieve the goals of providing some 
protection to high standards while providing incentives and means necessary for raising 
standards where they are deficient. This is of particular concern in North-South trade 
agreements. For instance, internal NAFTA trade in 2001 would have generated between 
  23$55 million and $281 million in SITS revenues under the same elasticity and base tariff 
assumptions that appear above, owing to the substantial gap in APERF values between 
Canada and Mexico. 
 
SITS Flows and Stability 
 
One of the problems with all international financial flows to developing countries is their 
variability during the business cycle. Historically, FDI flows have proven to be strongly 
pro-cyclical (especially but not only in relation to economic conditions in receiving 
countries). Indeed, from 2008 to 2009, global FDI flows to developing countries declined 
by 39% (World Bank 2011). In contrast, up to the onset of the current global crisis 
remittance flows have been countercyclical in relation to economic conditions in the 
receiving country, as migrant workers attempted to offset the hardships of their family 
members at home during economic difficulties (Grabel 2008). But in the current crisis, 
even remittances have proven to be pro-cyclical (dropping by a modest 5.5% from 2008 
to 2009), reflecting no doubt rising unemployment among migrant workers. ODA flows 
have also dropped off during the current crisis (by 6% from 2008 to 2009), when they are 
most needed (World Bank 2011).  
 
At any given base tariff, SITS revenues too would be pro-cyclical, though less so than 
FDI flows since trade does not contract during recessions as quickly or as deeply as does 
FDI. From 2008 to 2009, global trade flows declined by about 21%--greater than the 
decline in remittances but only about half the decline in FDI flows to developing 
countries.
12 But there is a key difference that warrants attention: Unlike the other inflows 
upon which developing countries depend, SITS revenues could easily be stabilized at any 
particular level through marginal adjustments in the SITS base tariff. This implies that 
the governing body that oversees the SITS regime could set an aggregate annual SITS 
revenue target, while the administrative authority that manages the regime could be given 
the more limited authority to adjust the base tariff marginally in response to global 
economic conditions to ensure that the revenue target is in fact met. Hence, the 
developing countries that depend on SITS revenues would not face further disruptions 
during the business cycle from variability in these flows; instead, SITS revenues would 
represent a stabilizing force during periods of economic instability.  
 
Overall, these data suggest that even small base tariff levels would substantially augment 
assistance to low-income countries. Since these new flows would be targeted to efforts to 
improve country performance in those areas that are incorporated into the APERF 
calculation, their potential effects might be more concentrated than those currently 
derived from ODA expenditures. Examples of the kinds of projects that SITS could fund 
include the development of technical, oversight and managerial capacity in 
environmental stewardship and in enforcement of labor and women’s employment rights. 
Finally, these flows would provide a basis of stability for developing countries during 
periods of macroeconomic fluctuation. 
 
 
                     
12 WTO data, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm. 
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Assessing SITS 
 
The SITS regime incorporates a simple principle: countries would be rewarded in global 
markets for making improvements in the conditions of social life that are codified in the 
index. Unlike the global neoliberal “free trade” regime, in which countries have reason to 
fear that they will be punished through diminished FDI inflows and deteriorating trade 
performance if they strengthen worker or women’s rights, promote equality or 
sustainability, under the SITS regime countries that take these steps would stand to 
receive both development assistance and improving access to global markets. The SITS 
regime protects workers and their communities from the pressures they face under global 
neoliberalism to accept lower wages and protective standards in order to retain 
employment.
13 The SITS regime is intended to reverse the incentive structure of global 
neoliberalism—by rewarding those strategies that promote capabilities equality, and by 
punishing those that undermine it.  
 
Every aspect of the SITS regime is flexible—from the calculation of index numbers to 
the determination of tariff band groupings, size of the tariffs, the conditions under which 
countries in distress due to natural or social disruptions might opt out of SITS or be 
provided free access to others’ markets, etc. Constructing any trade regime necessarily 
reflects various political, normative, economic and practical factors and judgments. The 
SITS approach is purposely under-specified in these regards, and this might be 
discomforting for those who seek simple and/or determinate rules of policymaking. But 
we would suggest that this aspect of SITS is a virtue which allows for the balancing of a 
great many distinct concerns and objectives.  
 
A viable SITS regime might also require provisions that permit opting out of SITS 
protections when a country deems it necessary to do so to promote important economic 
objectives. For instance, a high performer may opt not to impose the social tariff on a 
good (or service) that it imports from a lower performing country when imposing the 
tariff might impede its own development. This might be the case if the trading partner is 
the only practical source for the good, and the importing country does not itself have the 
capacity to produce that good for itself. In that case, the tariff may neither encourage the 
poor performer to improve its performance, nor protect industries (and their workers) in 
the importing country. In a case such as this, it might be desirable and appropriate for the 
importing country to choose to forgo the protection otherwise provided by the SITS 
                     
13 In the years immediately following the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, US 
workers attempting to form labor unions confronted a substantial increase in the 
incidence of employer threats to close operations and/or relocate (especially to Mexico). 
In those cases where workers nevertheless voted to unionize, the percentage of firms that 
did indeed make good on the threat to close increased threefold in the immediate 
aftermath of NAFTA (Bronfenbrenner 1996). This evidence suggests that workers in the 
North need defensive protections against the erosion of their effective labor rights; it also 
suggests that they are apt to continue opposing neoliberal trade regimes that exacerbate 




The flexibility of the SITS regime proves to be particularly virtuous in regards to the 
contentious matter of cultural autonomy (see UNDP 1999). Whenever we begin to 
consider the question of multilateral regimes to govern the behavior of trading partners, 
we immediately encounter the objection that cultural imperialism will trump the inter-
cultural respect that ought to obtain when countries encounter ways of being different 
from their own (Bhagwati and Srinavasan 1996). Indeed, this objection has been raised 
regularly in international forums where labor and environmental standards have been 
proposed as preconditions for trade or capital flows. Neoclassical economists in particular 
have come to embrace a rather severe form of cultural relativism as an ethical defense 
against fair trade initiatives (DeMartino 2000). 
 
Taking the matter of inter-cultural respect seriously, however, does not necessitate 
mainstream trade theory’s “anything goes” approach to comparative advantage. Instead, 
we should recognize that the SITS regime is flexible with respect to the manner in which 
a country increases its performance (thereby improving its social tariff position). A 
country can enhance its position by improving its educational attainment, longevity, 
gender or income equality, or its environmental stewardship. A composite index of this 
sort grants latitude for policymakers and activists in each society to define for themselves 
the content of their political interventions. Those in one country might prioritize stronger 
worker protections, while their counterparts abroad might concentrate on securing greater 
rights and freedoms for women (though these are by no means mutually exclusive). Their 
efforts in pursuit of objectives that reflect their own economic circumstances and social 
priorities would be rewarded in terms of the trading relationships facing their respective 
countries.  
 
How does SITS stand up against the evaluative criteria offered earlier? SITS provides an 
approach to fair trade that is just in the sense of requiring the greatest contribution from 
the richest countries while providing low-income countries with resources for enhancing 
                     
14 However, it bears noting that an opt-out mechanism of this sort may open the door to 
coercion, as politically powerful but low performing countries force higher performers to 
forego SITS tariff protections. This might imply the need for a rule-based opt-out 
mechanism that is overseen by a regulatory apparatus within the institution that governs 
the SITS regime. For example, some goods and services are vital for the health and 
wellbeing a country’s inhabitants. Further, some vital goods and services have no 
substitute; hence, subjecting them to a tariff could impose a burden on those most in 
need. Under a rule-based opt-out approach, countries might decide to exempt vital goods 
and services from the tariff. Alternatively, countries might be required to assess the tariff 
on these goods while being afforded the opportunity to petition to the institution that 
governs the SITS regime for an immediate rebate that would be used to offset the price 
increase in the imported good. The latter approach maintains the tariff structure and 
country participation and reduces the chances for political coercion by powerful 
exporters, while eliminating deleterious impacts of the operation of the SITS regime. 
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exclusively to countries that fall below some multiple of the world mean GDP/capita to 
ensure that on balance low-income countries benefit substantially from the trade regime. 
It is noteworthy that SITS tariffs reflect current performance, while the flow of 
development funds could be driven by current efforts. Successful strategies to improve 
human development performance would increase a country’s net gain since they would 
diminish penalties but not rewards. 
 
Next, as a consequence of its revenue distribution and its use of market competition, 
SITS entails a dynamic to promote improving human development performance over 
time. It both protects high standard countries from competition from low-standard 
countries while providing the latter with both an interest in and means to improve their 
performance. Moreover, while SITS is consistent with a liberal trading order, it 
nevertheless ensures that countries seek and achieve comparative advantage through 
means that are legitimate in the sense of promoting rather than diminishing human 
capabilities. 
 
The SITS regime is intended as an improvement over the other fair trade regimes that 
emerged in the 1990s (discussed above). But it bears emphasis that SITS can be 
implemented alongside, and would stand to improve, the operation of at least some of the 
other fair trade initiatives. For instance, SITS can be implemented alongside a social 
charter. Under this arrangement the social charter would specify the minimum standards 
that signatories must ensure in order to participate in the trading regime. At the same time 
and unlike the traditional social charter approach, the SITS-augmented social charter 
would provide the means and incentives necessary for countries to improve their 
performance beyond the minima that are codified in the social charter. As the lagging 
countries improve their performance above these minima the social charter could be 
adjusted upwards—raising the floor of rights and standards that it comprises. If/as the gap 
between leading and lagging country performance diminishes sufficiently in any 
indicator, this indicator could be removed from the SITS evaluation of country 
performance. The long-term goal associated with this dynamic would be to eliminate the 
SITS regime altogether in favor of a substantially strengthened social charter that is taken 
to provide adequate standards for all trading nations.  
 
It bears emphasis that economic policy regimes that emerge at the international level can 
and often do influence decisively domestic political struggles. A neoliberal regime 
substantially augments the influence of capital over that of labor in political controversies 
such as those that relate to worker rights (see fn 11, above). A SITS regime might begin 
to shift the burden in domestic political struggles in favor of the achievement of 
egalitarian reform. Labor rights activists would be able to seek new regulations without 
facing the objection that such measures would necessarily imperil the competitive 
survival of domestic firms or induce capital flight. At a minimum, a well-structured SITS 
regime would mitigate the effects of the increasing costs attending the new protections, 
and perhaps as a consequence, reduce the opposition to such measures from the business 
interests that will bear their proximate costs.  
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regime would be characteristically similar to the WTO or IMF, though one hopes with 
more inclusive governance mechanisms. These international organizations (IOs) are 
intended to monitor and evaluate member concerns, adjudicate disagreements and help to 
promote fluid organizational operation. A SITS-based international organization would 
be charged inter alia with creating the SITS index; establishing and enforcing the 
regime’s rules; monitoring country performance and development strategies; adjudicating 
disputes among member countries; determining eligibility for and levels of transfers of 
SITS tariff revenues between countries; and providing opportunities for meaningful 
participation by non-state actors.  As with all international regimes, SITS would be 
constantly reevaluated and updated to reflect improving data availability and changing 





It remains to make just a few points about the SITS regime as a thought experiment 
intended to promote new thinking about fair trade. First, it is worth noting that the SITS 
approach is not anti-growth. But it is hardly indifferent with respect to the means by 
which growth is pursued, or to the effects of unmanaged growth. Under SITS, 
capabilities-impoverishing strategies to achieve growth (such as labor oppression or 
ecological destruction) would be penalized in global markets. This, we suggest, is a 
necessary requirement of any appropriate fair trade regime. 
 
Second, neither is SITS anti-trade. SITS does not attempt to reverse the current trend 
toward deepening international economic integration. It attempts instead to put the 
efficiency gains of integration in service of the higher goal of global capabilities equality. 
Its intent is to reconfigure the incentives associated with market integration to remove 
those practices that currently promote competitiveness at the expense of human freedom. 
We seek to remove “X” from competition, where “X” stands in for all the strategies that 
promise competitive success while diminishing human capabilities (DeMartino 2000).
16 
                     
15 An IO that directs funding based on a quantitative index--such as is being proposed 
with SITS--would have significant influence.  While it may seem like an unprecedented 
allocation of authority in an IO, it certainly is not. Currently the World Bank Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment project creates an index that is designed to “capture 
the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements” (World Bank 
2010).  This index is used to allocate International Development Association funding and 
loans to developing countries. The country rankings are produced by World Bank “staff 
judgments” (World Bank 2010). 
 
 
16 The SITS regime is agnostic with respect to whether trade liberalization is beneficial 
for development. It could be established in the context of a liberal trading order; or it 
could exist alongside a trade regime that provides much more policy space for 
development than does the WTO or the many regional and bilateral trade and investment 
agreements that the US has negotiated with countries in the global South. That said, our 
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Third, it is a certainty that any imaginable SITS country rankings would be objectionable 
on many reasonable grounds. SITS invites argument over what is included in and 
excluded from its evaluation of performance; what weights should be assigned to those 
determinants of performance, and much else besides. But we should recognize that the 
dynamic introduced by the SITS is ultimately far more important than the initial rankings. 
The SITS regime provides the means and incentives for all countries (especially those 
that lag behind) to improve their performance over time. As countries improve both the 
number of the tariff bands and the magnitude of the base tariff could be reduced in order 
to lessen the regime’s penalties and impact on trade flows. Finally, we should take note 
that a shift from global neoliberalism to a SITS regime could and should be undertaken in 
phases. The first phase would entail negotiation of the details of the SITS regime, 
including the formula to be used in calculating performance, the base tariff, the means for 
distributing the tariff revenues, etc. A second phase might entail an adjustment period 
during which countries would have time to take steps to improve their performance and 
during which the new institutions underpinning this regime could be constructed. A third 
phase would entail a gradual introduction of the SITS tariffs. Moreover, the initial SITS 
performance calculations might include a term that rewards countries for their 
improvements during the adjustment period. Countries that perform well during this 
period might also be guaranteed a greater share of SITS-generated revenues. Moreover, 
like any other comprehensive policy initiative, SITS would no doubt induce unintended 
and undesirable consequences. In practice it would have to be amended and adjusted 
through ongoing negotiations to respond to and mitigate the harms that it causes.  
 
Finally, we emphasize that SITS or any other imaginable fair trade regime would be 
inadequate on its own to promote human development. Fair trade must be implemented 
alongside and integrated with a constellation of new egalitarian policy regimes that 
address financial flows, corporate practices, migration rights and other critical features of 
international integration. Designed with a focus on human development, such a 
constellation of policies might do far better than the neoliberal regime has done in 
advancing equality in genuine human freedoms.  
                                                             
view is that the latter affords a much more promising avenue for development (see 
Rodrik 2001; Chang 2002; Shadlen 2005); and that the SITS regime is entirely consistent 
with expanded policy space that affords developing countries the opportunity to pursue 
strategies that promise economic development, rising incomes, improving equality and 
human development.  
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